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Abstract
An investigator is interested in arbitrarily approximating a subject’s latent beliefs in obviously
dominant strategies (Li, 2017). We prove that Karni’s ascending mechanism (Karni, 2009)
does not have an obviously dominant strategy. Thus, we introduce the novel descending Karni
mechanism which always has obviously dominant strategies. Furthermore, under the assumption
that the subject chooses an obviously dominant strategy, the true beliefs can be approximated
with arbitrary precision with our mechanism. All our results hold for a very broad class of
likelihood relations, going well beyond those that are represented by probabilistic beliefs.
Keywords: Belief elicitation, Karni mechanism, obvious dominance.
JEL codes: C90, C91, D81, D82, D83.
1. Introduction
Eliciting subjective beliefs is a widely-studied problem both in economics as well as in many other
disciplines (Manski, 2004). Traditional examples of mechanisms that are commonly used for this
purpose include the proper scoring rule method (Brier, 1950; Savage, 1971) and the lotteries method
(Kadane and Winkler, 1988). More recently the family of Karni mechanisms has attracted attention
in the literature (Karni, 2009). These mechanisms resemble the structure of well-known auctions.
A minimal property that we would typically like our mechanism to satisfy is that it is (weakly)
dominant for experimental subjects to report truthfully. Unfortunately, despite the theoretical ap-
peal, dominant strategies are sometimes difficult to identify in practice (especially if the mechanism
is presented in its normal form), and a fortiori they are not always chosen by experimental sub-
jects. For instance, the dominant strategy in second price auctions is selected less often than in
strategically-equivalent ascending clock auctions (Kagel et al., 1987). In an attempt to explain this
behavioral irregularity, Li (2017) proposed a refinement of the dominance criterion. In particular, a
dominant strategy is said to be obviously dominant if at every information set that it reaches, the
best outcome following a deviation at this information set is not superior to the worst outcome that
can be achieved by sticking to said strategy from this information set onwards. He then provided
experimental evidence showing that obviously dominant strategies are chosen more frequently than
merely dominant ones (in mechanisms with the same normal form). Thus, our general research
question in this note is whether we can construct mechanisms that truthfully elicit subjective beliefs
in obviously dominant strategies.
∗I am indebted to Andy Mackenzie for his instrumental input to the paper.
†Department of Economics (AE1), Maastricht University, P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD, Maastricht, The Netherlands;
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We first observe that the basic static Karni mechanism does not have obviously dominant strate-
gies. In fact, static mechanisms rarely do (Section 4.3), suggesting that we should probably focus
on dynamic ones. To the best of our knowledge, the only existing candidate is Karni’s ascending
mechanism, which resembles an ascending clock auction and is strategically equivalent to his basic
static mechanism (Karni, 2009).1 However, as we prove, the ascending Karni mechanism does not
have an obviously dominant strategy (Theorem 1). Thus, we introduce a variant, which we call the
descending Karni mechanism, and we prove that an obviously dominant strategy always exists under
our novel descending mechanism. Moreover, with our mechanism, under the assumption that the
subject chooses an obviously dominant strategy, the investigator can elicit the subject’s true beliefs
with arbitrary precision (Theorem 2).
Notably, our results hold for a very broad set of subject’s preferences, going well beyond expected
utility theory (see Section 4.1 for a discussion). Indeed, we model subjective uncertainty with a
likelihood relation which is not necessarily represented by a probability measure (Koopman, 1940;
de Finetti, 1949). Within such a model, given that probabilities are not well defined, we need to
generalize the notion of “approximating the subject’s beliefs”. Indeed, we first fix a sequence of
events which the subject deems increasingly more likely, e.g., a sequence of nested events. Then,
our mechanism identifies two consecutive events in this sequence such that, the subject deems the
likelihood of our main event of interest to be between the respective likelihoods of these two events.
In the special case of probabilistic beliefs, said sequence of events could comprise of objective lotteries
with increasing number of winning tickets, thus eliciting an interval of probabilities within which the
subjective probability of our event of interest will belong.
The paper is structured as follows: In Section 2 we introduce the model and the two mechanisms.
In Section 3 we present the solution concepts and our two results. Section 4 contains a discussion.
All proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
2. Model and mechanisms
There is an algebra A of events. A male subject’s (latent) likelihood relation  is modelled by a
weak order over A. Each event A ∈ A is associated with the act that pays a fixed prize (desired by
the subject) when A occurs and pays nothing otherwise. In this sense, whenever the subject receives
the corresponding act, we simply say that he receives A. Hence, it is the case that A is deemed
(weakly) more likely than B if and only if the act that is associated with A is (weakly) preferred to
the act associated with B.
We fix an arbitrary event E ∈ A and consider a sequence of events A1, . . . , AT ∈ A such that:
(L1) AT  · · ·  At+1  At  · · ·  A1,
(L2) AT  E  A1.
We denote the class of likelihood relations that satisfy (L1) − (L2) by L. Although the subject’s
likelihood relation is private information (i.e.,  is latent), the investigator is assumed to know that
it satisfies the previous two conditions (i.e.,  ∈ L).2 Hence for every likelihood relation  ∈ L there
exists some t ∈ {1, . . . , T − 1} such that
At+1  E  At. (1)
1In the original paper, the mechanism is defined in continuous time. Since we are mostly interested in actual
implementation, we focus on the discrete version of the mechanism (see Section 4.2 for a discussion).
2This assumption is easily justified when A is an algebra over the state space Ω such that A1 = ∅ and AT = Ω,
with (At)
T
t=1 being a sequence of nested events and the subject’s preferences satisfying monotonicity (see Section 4.1).
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A female investigator is then interested in eliciting such t ∈ {1, . . . , T − 1}. In other words, she is
interested in learning how likely E is, in relation to the events A1, . . . , AT .
We consider two mechanisms, the ascending Karni mechanism (Karni, 2009) and the novel de-
scending Karni mechanism, both of which bear similarity to clock auctions. Assume that the set
T := {1, . . . , T}
is used as a time index. At the initial history the investigator (playing as nature) draws some s ∈ T ,
henceforth called the stopping time, which is unknown to the subject. It is known to the subject
that all stopping times in T occur with positive probability (without being necessarily equally likely
though).3 The subject is then sequentially presented with exit opportunities, until right before the
stopping time is reached. In the ascending mechanism, exit opportunities start at t = 1 and count
upwards till t = s−1, whereas in the descending mechanism they start at t = T and count downwards
till t = s + 1. Thus, non-terminal histories are identified by pairs of the form (t, s), with t being
the current exit opportunity (which is always observed by the subject) and s being the stopping time
(which, as we have already mentioned, is not observed before having been reached). There are two
available actions at each non-terminal history in each mechanism, viz., stay (s) and exit (e). Let us
describe the two mechanisms in detail.
Definition 1. (Ascending Karni mechanism). The first exit opportunity is t = 1. The set of
non-terminal histories is Ha := {(t, s) ∈ T 2 : t < s}, with each information set being identified by
the respective exit opportunity in Ta := {1, . . . , T −1}, i.e., the information set {(t, t+ 1), . . . , (t, T )}
is identified by t ∈ Ta. The histories are ordered as follows:
• The subject exits: if the subject exits at a non-terminal history (t, s), the game ends and
he receives As.
• The subject stays and a stopping time is not immediately reached: if the subject
stays at (t, s) with t < s− 1, then the non-terminal history (t+ 1, s) is reached.
• The subject stays and a stopping time is immediately reached: if the subject stays
at (s− 1, s), then the game ends and he receives E.
A pure strategy (for the subject) in the ascending mechanism is a mapping σ : Ta → {s, e}, with
Sa denoting the set of all pure strategies. For a strategy σ ∈ Sa, we define the corresponding exit
time,
ta(σ) := min
{ {t ∈ Ta : σ(t) = e} ∪ {T} } .
The condition ta(σ) = T implies that the subject does not take any exit opportunity, thus choosing
to stay until a stopping time is reached. Then, we define the reachable exit opportunities by
Ta(σ) := {t ∈ Ta : t ≤ ta(σ)}
for a strategy s ∈ Sa.
Definition 2. (Descending Karni mechanism). The first exit opportunity is t = T . The set of
non-terminal histories is Hd := {(t, s) ∈ T 2 : t > s}, with each information set being identified by
the respective exit opportunity in Td := {2, . . . , T}, i.e., the information set {(t, 1), . . . , (t, t− 1)} is
identified by t ∈ Td. The histories are ordered as follows:
3For our analysis the actual probability of each stopping time being drawn is irrelevant as long as they all occur
with positive probability.
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• The subject exits: if the subject exits at a non-terminal history (t, s), the game ends and
he receives E.
• The subject stays and a stopping time is not immediately reached: if the subject
stays at (t, s) with t > s+ 1, then the non-terminal history (t− 1, s) is reached.
• The subject stays and a stopping time is immediately reached: if the subject stays
at (s− 1, s), then the game ends and he receives As.
Similarly to the previous case, a pure strategy (for the subject) in the descending mechanism is a
mapping σ : Td → {s, e}, with Sd denoting the set of all pure strategies. For a strategy σ ∈ Sd, we
define the corresponding exit time,
td(σ) := max
{ {t ∈ Td : σ(t) = e} ∪ {1} } .
The condition ta(σ) = 1 says that the subject does not take any exit opportunity, thus choosing to
stay until nature stops the clock. Then, we define the reachable exit opportunities by
Td(σ) := {t ∈ Td : t ≥ td(σ)}
for a strategy s ∈ Sd.
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Figure 1: The two Karni mechanisms with T = {1, 2, 3, 4}.
Henceforth, we denote by S the set of strategies when we wish to speak of both mechanisms simul-
taneously, with the understanding that each mechanism should be considered with its corresponding
definitions. Likewise, t(σ) and T (σ) are the general definitions of the exit time and the reachable
exit opportunities for a strategy σ ∈ S. Moreover, for each t ∈ T , we denote by σt ∈ S a typical
strategy such that t(σt) = t.
Let O(σ|t, s) denote the event that the subject receives by playing σ from (t, s) onwards con-
ditional on (t, s) having been reached, with O(σ|s) being the event that he receives by σ at the
first information set, i.e., in the ascending mechanism O(σ|s) := O(σ|1, s) and in the descending
mechanism O(σ|s) := O(σ|T, s).
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3. Solution concepts and results
We consider the following solution concepts:
Definition 3. (Dominance). A pure strategy σ ∈ S is -dominant if for all s ∈ T and all σ′ ∈ S,
O(σ|s)  O(σ′|s). (2)
The set of all -dominant strategies is denoted by D ⊆ S.
Definition 4. (Obvious Dominance). A pure strategy σ ∈ S is -obviously dominant if for each
t ∈ T (σ), for each pair of non-terminal histories (t, s) and (t, s′), and each σ′ ∈ S such that t ∈ T (σ′)
and σ′(t) 6= σ(t)
O(σ|t, s)  O(σ′|t, s′). (3)
The set of all -obviously dominant strategies is denoted by OD ⊆ S.
Dominance is the usual requirement that σ performs at least as well as any alternative strategy no
matter which final offer nature has chosen. Note that we are not comparing payoffs given each state
of nature, but rather given each stopping time. Obvious dominance is stronger, requiring that at each
information set of non-terminal histories that can be reached under σ, the worst case from proceeding
with σ is at least as desirable as the best case that might result from deviating to another strategy
σ′ that also reaches this information set and prescribes a different action at this same information
set.
Define the set of exit times that can be observed under the assumptions that the subject chooses
dominant and obviously dominant strategies respectively:
T D := {t(σ) | σ ∈ D},
T OD := {t(σ) | σ ∈ OD}.
Definition 5. (Dominance Eliciting Mechanism). A mechanism is dominance eliciting if ex-
actly one of the following two conditions holds:
(i) ∅ 6= T D ⊆ {t ∈ T : At+1  E  At} for every  ∈ L.
(ii) ∅ 6= T D ⊆ {t ∈ T : At  E  At−1} for every  ∈ L.
A mechanism is fully dominance eliciting whenever the respective weak inclusion holds with equality.
Definition 6. (Obvious Dominance Eliciting Mechanism). A mechanism is obvious domi-
nance eliciting if exactly one of the following two conditions holds:
(i) ∅ 6= T OD ⊆ {t ∈ T : At+1  E  At}} for every  ∈ L.
(ii) ∅ 6= T OD ⊆ {t ∈ T : At  E  At−1} for every  ∈ L.
A mechanism is fully obvious dominance eliciting whenever the respective weak inclusion holds with
equality.
Thus, a mechanism is dominance eliciting, if a dominant strategy exists, and moreover – assuming
that the subject surely plays a dominant strategy – if the investigator observes an exit time t then
she learns that either At+1  E  At or At  E  At−1. Notice the order of the quantifiers, viz.,
either the first condition holds for all likelihood relations or the second one does for all likelihood
relations, rather than for all likelihood relations one of the two conditions holding. The mechanism
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is fully dominance eliciting if the converse holds too, i.e., the only strategies that are dominant
are those satisfying the respective condition. For an obvious dominance eliciting mechanism, the
previous conditions are true under the considerably stronger assumption that a subject is sure to
play an obviously dominant strategy. Therefore, an obvious dominance eliciting (resp., fully obvious
dominance eliciting) mechanism is dominance eliciting (resp., fully dominance eliciting), but not
necessarily vice versa. Then, we are ready to present our two results:
Theorem 1. The ascending Karni mechanism is fully dominance eliciting, but not obvious domi-
nance eliciting.
Sketch of the proof (for T = 4). We consider the mechanism depicted in Figure 1(a), while
the full proof for arbitrary T > 0 is relegated to the Appendix.
First, assume that E is ranked strictly between two of our events, e.g., let A3  E  A2. In this
case, the only dominant strategy is to exit at t = 2, i.e., T D = {2} = {t ∈ T : At+1  E  At}.
Second, assume that E is equally likely as one of our events, e.g., let E ∼ A2. In this case, the two
dominant strategies are to exit at t = 1 or to exit at t = 2, i.e., T D = {1, 2} = {t ∈ T : At+1 
E  At}. Hence, Condition (i) in Definition 5 holds with equality for every  ∈ L, and therefore
the ascending Karni mechanism is fully dominance eliciting.
Now, going back to the case where A3  E  A2, observe that the unique dominant strategy
is not obviously dominant. Indeed, conditional on the current information set (t = 2), the best
case scenario if the subject exits at t = 3 is A4 which is superior to the worst case scenario if he
exits at t = 2 which is A3. Therefore, the set of obviously dominant strategies is empty for some
 ∈ L, implying that the mechanism does not satisfy either of the two conditions of Definition 6,
and therefore it is not obvious dominance eliciting.
Theorem 2. The descending Karni mechanism is fully obvious dominance eliciting.
Sketch of the proof (for T = 4). We now switch attention to the mechanism depicted in Fig-
ure 1(b), while the full proof for arbitrary T > 0 is relegated to the Appendix.
First, assume that E is ranked strictly between two of our events, e.g., let A3  E  A2. In
this case the only obviously dominant strategy is to exit at t = 3, i.e., T OD = {3} = {t ∈ T :
At  E  At−1}. Second, assume that E is equally likely as one of our events, e.g., let E ∼ A3.
In this case, the two obviously dominant strategies are to exit at t = 3 or to exit at t = 4, i.e.,
T OD = {3, 4} = {t ∈ T : At  E  At−1}. Hence, Condition (ii) in Definition 5 holds with
equality for every  ∈ L, and therefore the ascending Karni mechanism is fully obvious dominance
eliciting.
4. Discussion
4.1. Preference specifications
Throughout the paper we have considered a very broad family of preferences. Formally, there exists
a set of outcomes X and a measurable state space (Ω,A). The subject has complete and transitive
preferences D over the set of A-measurable acts in XΩ. As usual, with slight abuse of notation, we
write x D y whenever the constant act that pays x at every state is weakly preferred to the constant
act that pays y at every state.
For two outcomes x, y ∈ X and an event A ∈ A, we denote by xAy the act that pays x if A occurs
and pays y otherwise. Then, for x D y and x′ D y′, we further postulate xAy D xBy if and only if
x′Ay
′ D x′By′, viz., we postulate Savage’s (1954) weak comparative probability. Then, the likelihood
relation  is obtained as follows: for x D y and any two A,B ∈ A, it is the case that A  B if
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and only if xAy D xBy. While this axiom is not in principle needed for our results, we impose it so
that the likelihood relation does not depend on the prize, which is quite natural to assume. In other
words, the likelihood relation is the primitive that we would like to elicit, and the choice of the prize
is inconsequential for the elicited qualitative beliefs.
Moreover, although not formally needed for our results, we can naturally further assume mono-
tonicity with respect to set inclusion, i.e., if A ⊇ B then A  B. This is a weakening of Anscombe
and Aumann’s (1963) monotonicity. In this case, we can select any nested sequence of events,
Ω =: AT ⊃ · · · ⊃ At ⊃ · · · ⊃ A1 := ∅,
and the two conditions (L1)− (L2) hold trivially for every E ∈ A.
The most common special case of our preferences is a preference relation represented by an
expected utility function, in which case  is represented by a (unique probability) measure µ ∈
∆(Ω,A), such that A  B if and only if µ(A) ≥ µ(B).
4.2. Discrete versus continuous mechanisms
Contrary to original continuous (descending) mechanism (Karni, 2009), here we consider the discrete
counterpart. The reason for this slight departure is twofold. First, theoretically there are strate-
gies that it is not clear how they should be implemented, e.g., consider the continuous ascending
mechanism and suppose that σ is such that the subject stays at every t ∈ [0, τ ] and exits at every
t ∈ (τ, T ]. Then, the subject’s exit time is not well-defined, as {t ∈ [0, T ] : σ(t) = e} does not achieve
a minimum. The second reason is more of practical nature. It is very hard to imagine how one would
implement continuous strategies in the lab. In either case our theoretical results suggest that – even
with discrete mechanisms – we can approximate the subject’s beliefs with arbitrary precision. In-
deed, we can arbitrarily choose a “discrete ruler” to measure the beliefs, viz., the sequence of events
A1, . . . , AT . Notably the ruler can consist of events that are assigned an objective probability, as in
the example in the introduction. In this case, we can put E in a probability scale with arbitrary
precision.
4.3. Static Karni mechanism
As we have already mentioned in the introduction, static mechanisms rarely have an obviously
dominant strategy. Let us illustrate that this is the case for the static counterpart of each of the two
dynamic mechanisms that we consider in this paper.
Starting with the ascending mechanism, the corresponding static mechanism would be defined as
follows: the investigator randomly draws some some s ∈ T , while the subject chooses some t ∈ Ta.
The payoff are defined analogously to the dynamic mechanism, i.e., the subject receives As is t < s,
and he receives E if t ≥ s. On the other hand, the corresponding static mechanism to our descending
Karni mechanism is defined as follows: the investigator again randomly draws some some s ∈ T ,
while the subject chooses some t ∈ Td. The subject receives E if t > s, and he receives As if t ≤ s.
A strategy t is obviously dominant if the worst case scenario from choosing t is at least as good as
the best case scenario from choosing any other τ 6= t.
It is not difficult to verify that there is no such strategy for any of the two mechanisms. To
see this observe that a strategy is obviously dominant in the corresponding static mechanism if and
only if the aforementioned condition holds at the first information set of the corresponding dynamic
mechanism.
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4.4. Multiple events
In his original paper, Karni (2009) mentions that his (continuous static) mechanism can be also
used to elicit a multinomial distribution (i.e., subjective beliefs about multiple events) in dominant
strategies, by repeatedly applying it for each event separately. This approach does not directly extend
to elicitation in obviously dominant strategies, even if we use our novel descending mechanism.
In order to do so, we would need to carefully select the stakes that we pay for each of the events
whose subjective probability we want to elicit. Take for instance a partition E = {E1, E2, E3} of
events, and assume that the subject has probabilistic beliefs about the events in E . The investigator
is interested in approximating these beliefs with error no larger than 1/T . To this end, she first runs
the descending mechanism to elicit the probability that the subject attaches to E1, using a sequence
of events A11, . . . , A
1
T such that A
1
t is a lottery that yields the prize with probability t/T . Subsequently,
she runs again the descending mechanism to elicit the probability that the subject attaches to E2,
using a sequence of events A21, . . . , A
2
T such that A
2
t is a lottery that yields the prize with probability
t/T . That way, the obviously dominant strategy in the first mechanism is not affected by the existence
of the second mechanism, i.e., the two mechanisms are effectively independent.
A. Proofs
A.1. Proof of Theorem 1
Lemma A1. If At+1  E  At for some t ∈ {1, . . . , T − 1}, then T D = {t}.
Proof. Downward deviations: Take some τ < t and consider the corresponding strategy στ . Take
a stopping time s ∈ T , and consider the following three cases:
(i) s ≤ τ < t : Then, we obtain O(σt|s) = O(στ |s) = E.
(ii) τ < s ≤ t : Then, we obtain O(σt|s) = E  At  As = O(στ |s).
(ii) τ < t < s : Then, we obtain O(σt|s) = O(στ |s) = As.
Hence, O(σt|s)  O(στ |s) for all s ∈ T , with the preference relation being strict for some s ∈ T .
Upward deviations: Take some τ < t and consider the corresponding strategy στ . Once again, take
a stopping time s ∈ T , and consider the following three cases:
(i) s ≤ t < τ : Then, we obtain O(σt|s) = O(στ |s) = E.
(ii) t < s ≤ τ : Then, we obtain O(σt|s) = As  At+1  E = O(στ |s). The weak preference
As  At+1 follows from s ≥ t+ 1, which is the case because s ∈ T .
(ii) t < τ < s : Then, we obtain O(σt|s) = O(στ |s) = As.
Once again, O(σt|s)  O(στ |s) for all s ∈ T , with the preference relation being strict for some s ∈ T .
Combine the previous two cases and the proof is completed.
Lemma A2. If A1 ∼ E, then T D = {1}. If At ∼ E for some t ∈ T \ {1}, then T D = {t− 1, t}.
Proof. Downward deviations: This part is relevant only for the case where At ∼ E for some
t ∈ T \{1}. Take some τ < t and consider the corresponding strategy στ . Take stopping time s ∈ T ,
and consider the following three cases:
(i) s ≤ τ < t : Then, we obtain O(σt|s) = O(στ |s) = E.
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(ii) τ < s ≤ t : Then, we obtain O(σt|s) = E ∼ At  As = O(στ |s). If τ = t− 1, then t = s, and
therefore At ∼ As. If on the other hand, τ < t− 1, then for any s ∈ T with τ < s < t it is the
case that At  As.
(ii) τ < t < s : Then, we obtain O(σt|s) = O(στ |s) = As.
Hence, O(σt|s)  O(στ |s) for all s ∈ T , with the preference relation being strict for some s ∈ T if
and only if τ < t− 1.
Upward deviations: This part is relevant for both cases, i.e., when At ∼ E for any t ∈ T . Take some
τ > t and consider the corresponding strategy στ . Following identical steps to the respective part of
Lemma A1, we show that O(σt|s)  O(στ |s) for all s ∈ T , with the preference relation being strict
for some s ∈ T .
Combine the previous two cases to complete the proof.
Dominance: If  ∈ L is such that At+1  E  At then {t ∈ T : At+1  E  At} = {t},
and thus by Lemma A1, we obtain T D = {t ∈ T : At+1  E  At}. Second, suppose that
 ∈ L is such that A1 ∼ E, in which case {t ∈ T : A2  E  A1} = {1}, and by Lemma A2,
we obtain T D = {t ∈ T : A2  E  A1}. Finally, let  ∈ L be such that At ∼ E for some
t ∈ T \ {1}, in which case {t′ ∈ T : At′+1  E  At′} = {t− 1, t}. Hence, by Lemma A2, we obtain
T D = {t ∈ T : At+1  E  At}. Therefore, Condition (i) in Definition 5 is satisfied with equality,
implying that the ascending Karni mechanism is fully dominance eliciting.
Obvious dominance: Let t < T − 1 and consider some  ∈ L such that At+1  E  At, implying
that T D = {t} (by Lemma A1), and therefore T OD ⊆ {t}. Then, take t < τ ≤ s < s′, and observe
that O(σt|t, s) = As ≺ As′ = O(στ |t, s′) for any στ , implying that T OD = ∅. Therefore, the ascending
Karni mechanism is not obvious dominance eliciting.
A.2. Proof of Theorem 2
Lemma A3. If At  E  At−1 for some t ∈ {2, . . . , T}, then T OD = {t}.
Proof. Upward deviations: Take an arbitrary τ > t, and consider a strategy στ ∈ S such that
t(στ ) = τ . Take two non-terminal histories (τ, s) and (τ, s
′). Then, consider the following two cases:
(i) t ≤ s : Then, we obtain O(σt|τ, s) = As  E = O(στ |τ, s′).
(i) s < t : Then, we obtain O(σt|τ, s) = E = O(στ |τ, s′).
Downward deviations: Take an arbitrary τ < t, and consider a strategy στ ∈ S such that t(στ ) = τ .
Take two non-terminal histories (t, s) and (t, s′). Then, consider the following two cases:
(i) τ ≤ s′ : Then, we obtain O(σt|t, s) = E  At−1  As′ = O(στ |t, s′).
(i) s′ < τ : Then, we obtain O(σt|t, s) = E = O(στ |t, s′).
Putting the previous two cases together implies that T OD = {t}.
Lemma A4. If AT ∼ E, then T OD = {T}. If At ∼ E for some t ∈ T \ {T}, then T OD = {t, t+ 1}.
Proof. Upward deviations: This part is relevant only for the case where At ∼ E for some t ∈ T \{n}.
Take some τ > t and consider the corresponding strategy στ . Take two non-terminal histories (τ, s)
and (τ, s′). Then, consider the following two cases:
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(i) t ≤ s : Then, we obtain O(σt|τ, s) = As  At ∼ E = O(στ |τ, s′), with the preference relation
being strict for some non-terminal histories (τ, s) and (τ, s′) if and only of τ > t+ 1.
(ii) s < t : Then, we obtain O(σt|τ, s) = E = O(στ |τ, s′).
Downward deviations: This part is relevant for both cases, i.e., when At ∼ E for any t ∈ T . Take
some τ < t and consider the corresponding strategy στ . Following identical steps to the respective
part of Lemma A3, we show that O(σt|t, s)  O(στ |t, s′), with the inequality being strict for some
non-terminal histories (t, s) and (t, s′).
Put the previous two parts together and the result is proven.
Obvious dominance: By Lemmas A3 and A4, it is the case that T OD 6= ∅ for every  ∈ L.
Then, if  ∈ L is such that At+1  E  At then {t ∈ T : At+1  E  At} = {t}, and thus
by Lemma A3, we obtain T OD = {t ∈ T : At+1  E  At}. Second, suppose that  ∈ L is
such that AT ∼ E, in which case {t ∈ T : At  E  At−1} = {T}, and by Lemma A4, we
obtain T D = {t ∈ T : At  E  At−1}. Finally, let  ∈ L be such that At ∼ E for some
t ∈ T \ {T}, in which case {t′ ∈ T : At′+1  E  At′} = {t, t+ 1}. Hence, by Lemma A4, we obtain
T D = {t ∈ T : At  E  At−1}. Therefore, Condition (ii) in Definition 6 is satisfied with equality,
implying that the ascending Karni mechanism is fully obvious dominance eliciting.
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